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The law assumes that all donors are altruistic, when they are not. It assumes that all donors care 
about the charitable ends to which they give their money, when they do not. In consequence of 
the law’s misconception, judges sometimes proceed to return gifts without a sound legal 
rationale for doing so. It is argued that where gifts fail, the legal basis of return is that, in 
analogy with frustrated consumers who have paid for unobtainable goods, donors should get 
their money back. With reference to altruism and egoism as the concepts are understood in 
economic donative theory,1 it will be seen that this legal logic only bites in relation to 
individuals who genuinely care about the delivery of charitable outcomes.  
The law has a blind-spot in relation to egoistic intent. Such individuals donate for a personal 
satisfaction which is entirely removed from the achievement of any other-regarding charitable 
outcome.2 If they are purely egoistic, these donors cannot be frustrated where gifts fail. End-
goals are unimportant to them. They had their satisfaction at the point of donation when they 
consumed a joy-of-giving.3 They are not frustrated, and so they are outside the rationale of 
return. 
                                                          
1 See generally J Elster, ‘The Valmont Effect: The Warm-Glow Theory of Philanthropy’ in P Illingworth et al 
(eds), Giving Well: The Ethics of Philanthropy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 67; A Kotzebue, On 
Collective Goods, Voluntary Contributions and Fundraising (Karlsruher, Springer Gabler, 2013) 4-13; Sen, 
‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory’ (1977) 6 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 317. 
2 See J Andreoni, ‘Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving’ (1990) 
100 The Economic Journal 464; W Harbaugh, ‘The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers’ (1998) 88 
The American Economic Review 227; see generally A Rutherford, ‘Get by with a Little Help from my Friends: 
A Recent History of Charitable Organisations in Economic Theory’ (2010) 17 European Journal of Economic 
Thought 1031. 
3 Joy-of-giving is itself understood a consumable good: D Ribar and M Wilhelm, ‘Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving 
Motivations in Charitable Behavior’ (2002) 110 Journal of Political Economy 424; Kotzebue, On Collective 
Goods (n1) 10. 
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It is in difficult cases - failure cases - that judicial understandings of donor motivation come to 
the fore. In the normal course, when donors part with their money, their gifts flow up a legal 
pipeline and into the lives of others without any cause for an analysis of the donor’s wishes. In 
ordinary cases, the law channels, but does not query too deeply, the motivation behind the gift. 
But where the pipeline fractures because the donor’s instructions prove impossible to effect, 
the law is put to much heavier work. It is at this pressure point of failure, where for example a 
donor has left insufficient funds,4 a trustee disclaims,5 or a nominated charity has closed down,6 
that the law, which attempts to effect what the donor would have subjectively wished,7 leaks 
its assumptions about the nature of donor motivation. 
Critical economic analysis of the law’s understanding of donor motivation marks a fresh line 
of enquiry. While economics and charity law have in recent times formed a fruitful critical 
pairing,8 contemporary economic enquiry turns mostly upon issues of broad political economy. 
That is, charity’s role within the so-called third sector between state and market.9 Individual-
level economic understandings of donor motivation have been left more or less untouched in 
legal scholarship. On the very rare occasions where micro-level economic concepts are applied 
to law, the focus has been on the impact of the law upon overall distributions of charitable 
wealth.10  
This chapter departs from previous ‘public’ economic approaches, using micro-level concepts 
(economic altruism and economic egoism) to critique the courts’ understanding of individual 
minds. This enables a fresh conceptual claim: that the rationale for return is based in frustrated 
economic altruism.11 Building on that claim, it is further argued that where gifts are driven by 
unalloyed egoism, judges - unable to recognise the fact - sometimes return gifts without cause. 
And so the application of donative economic theory will both reveal the altruistic basis of the 
law of return and also problematise the law’s treatment of egoistic gifts outside that altruistic 
rationale. Most broadly, it will throw up deep-seated and hitherto unexamined legal 
assumptions about donative intent. 
On an original view within economic donative theory, donors are modelled as altruistic.12 
Altruism in this context has a meaning more focussed than the ordinary use of the word. 
                                                          
4 Re Wilson [1913] 1 Ch 314 (Ch); Re Good Will Trusts [1950] 2 All ER 653 (Ch); Re Woodhams [1981] 1 
WLR 493 (Ch). 
5 Re Robinson [1923] 2 Ch 332 (Ch); Re Lysaght [1966] 1 Ch 191 (Ch). 
6 Re Rymer [1895] 1 Ch 10 (CA); Kings v Bultitude [2010] EWHC 1795 (Ch), [2010] WTLR 1571; Phillips v 
Royal Society for Birds [2012] EWHC 618 (Ch), [2012] WTLR 891. 
7 See, eg Re Broadbent [2001] EWCA Civ 714, [2001] WTLR 967, [44]; Executor Trustee and Agency Co of 
South Australia Ltd v Warbey (No 2) (1973) SASR 336, 345. 
8 See eg: J Garton, Regulation of Organised Civil Society (Oxford, Hart, 2009); J Garton, Public Benefit in 
Charity Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). 
9 J Philips et al, Between State and Market (Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001); L Salamon, The 
State of Non-Profit America, 2nd edn (Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2012); H Anheier, Non-Profit 
Organisations: Theory, Management, Policy, 2nd edn (London, Routledge, 2014). 
10 M Bac, ‘Restricted Charitable Donations and the “Cy Pres” Doctrine’ (2002) 14 European Journal of Law 
and Economics 15, 17; J Garton, ‘Justifying the Cy-Pres Doctrine’ (2007) 21 Trust Law International 134, 145-
149. 
11 See M Harding, Charity Law and the Liberal State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 89-92 for 
analysis of a connection between altruism, charity law and political liberalism. 
12 P Warr, ‘The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent of the Distribution of Income’ (1983) 13 
Economic Letters 207; R Roberts, ‘A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers’ (1984) 92 Journal 
of Political Economy 136. 
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Altruistic donors, in the economic sense, are minded to give because they derive satisfaction 
from the consumption of others.13 They care about the charitable ends to which their gifts are 
applied. In Strangers Drowning,14 MacFarquhar describes the lived experience of individuals 
she calls ‘do-gooders’.15 One of these, Julia Wise, matches altruism in the economic sense. 
Described as both rational and ardent,16 she gives as much of her income away to charity as 
she can, leaving the minimum possible for her own restricted life. However, it is her motivation 
rather than her resulting penury which is important. She gives out of a concern to materially 
better the lives of others. She funds cost-effective medical interventions in low income 
countries. Crucially, she is motivated only by material outcomes; economic results that benefit 
others. She gets no egoistic glow; only the ends matter. 
Alongside altruism, in more recent times, donative economic theory has developed a 
complementary type of motivation - egoism, or the consumption of joy-of-giving.17 It is central 
to the concept that an entirely egoistic donor is unconcerned with charitable outcomes. That is, 
she might happen to give to charity, but she will not care whether other people consume the 
charitable goods she incidentally provides. Her motivation does not lie in the material 
advantage of other people. Beveridge in Voluntary Action,18 a post-war report on the charitable 
sector, detailed the case of George Jarvis, who had been a man of substantial property in 
Herefordshire, and who almost perfectly represents pure charitable egoism in this economic 
sense.19 George Jarvis’s neighbours reported that no intention to make a gift to charity had ever 
entered his mind until he became displeased with his daughter’s choice of husband. Beveridge 
writes that, ‘he lived to see her become a mother and grandmother, but nursed his resentment 
to the end.’20 Out of apparent spite to his daughter, upon his death, he established a charity for 
the relief of the poor, so as to disinherit her. George Jarvis can be described as an egoistic donor 
in the economic sense. In contrast to Julia Wise, the charitable outcome of his gift was 
unimportant. He was entirely indifferent whether poverty was in fact alleviated, he just wanted 
to spite his daughter. He was motivated by a joy-of-giving, albeit of a malign type. 
The altruistic motivation of Julia Wise comes to us more readily than the purely egoistic intent 
of George Jarvis. We more naturally associate outcome-driven altruism with charitable giving. 
However, economic egoism, where the charitable goods supplied by the donor are incidental 
to the motivation behind the gift, does occur in a familiar modern context; it is often 
deliberately induced in circumstances of professionally organised fund-raising drives.21 So for 
example, in in Serpentine Trust Limited v HMRC,22 a set of inducements made by an art gallery, 
including inter alia opportunities for private hire, priority booking and free invitations to events 
were held to be so vital in attracting donations as to be classed as transfers for consideration.23 
                                                          
13 See, eg Kotzebue (n1) 5-10. 
14 L MacFarquhar, Strangers Drowning: Voyages to the Brink of Moral Extremity (St Ives, Penguin, 2016). 
15 Ibid 3. 
16 Ibid 71. 
17 See, eg Andreoni, ‘Impure Altruism’ (n2); Harbaugh, ‘The Prestige Motive’ (n2). Landry et al, ‘Towards an 
Understanding of the Economics of Charity’ (2006) 121 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 747; Buraschi and 
Cornelli, ‘Donations’ (2002) CEPR discussion paper 3488. 
18 W Beveridge, Voluntary Action (Oxford, Routledge, 2015). 
19 Ibid 374 
20 Ibid. 
21 See, eg M Worth, Fundraising: Principles and Practice (Thousand Oaks, SAGE, 2016) 309-314.  
22 Serpentine Trust Limited v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 876 (TC). 
23 Ibid [43]. 
4 
 
For any donors induced by these financial benefits alone, the charitable ends to which their 
money would be applied will have been entirely incidental to their motivation to give. They 
will have been egoistic consumers, unconcerned with the cultural cause. 
First, we begin by acknowledging both the contribution and the limitations of this micro-level 
economic framework. Second, the altruistic basis of the law is uncovered. This builds into a 
claim that the rationale for return is found in frustrated altruism. Third, we assess return in the 
context of purely egoistic giving. It is argued that, at the level of legal principle, egoistic gifts 
should always be kept in charity. Fourth, moving to an applied precedential analysis of the 
theory, it is then argued that the courts return egoistic gifts without any coherent doctrinal 
reason for doing so. Finally, equipped with a theoretical vantage point, it is argued that 
attempted statutory reform in the context of public appeals suffers for want of clear theory. 
I. THE LIMITS AND CONTRIBUTION OF A BINARY FRAMEWORK 
Economic donative theory lends the analysis a particular view of donor motivation. In turn, it 
becomes possible to match that view with the existing law of return and so criticise the courts 
for their egoistic blind-spot. It is important to note that donative theory builds on the voluntary 
nature of charity, emphasising that donors make choices according to their motivational 
preferences.24 Yet it supplies only a binary framework of egoism and altruism. Every charitable 
impulse is slotted within two poles. 
It is necessary to acknowledge the limits of the binary and to explain why, despite those limits, 
the framework is relevant to legal argument. In consequence of its double-edged nature, 
economic donative theory cannot provide us with a full-fleshed understanding of charity in 
complex society. It can tell us that donors might derive egoism-based or altruism-based 
satisfaction, but it cannot tell us why, or explain why we are so motivated. Notably, the binary 
cannot explain why some of us might be compelled to take great risks for others, or why we 
might care so much that we have the capacity to take those risks. Monroe claims with reference 
to risk-takers, ‘that altruists simply have a different way of seeing things. Where the rest of us 
see a stranger, altruists see a human being.’25 By its nature, the altruistic/egoistic binary is too 
formalistic to fully explain why some of us are Good Samaritans.26 
But economic donative theory can make an important critical contribution to legal analysis, not 
least because the altruistic side of the binary so closely matches judges’ own views of donors. 
In this chapter, the binary will be put to an analytical use: as a heuristic, it will help to unlock 
and then critique the courts’ framework of return. Weaved throughout this chapter, it will be 
seen from the luxuriously detailed individual analyses of gifts made by judges, that courts see 
charitable motivation as altruistically outcome-driven in the economic sense. And, most 
importantly, the concept of self-interested, ego-driven donation provides a new tool with which 
                                                          
24 Based in neoclassical economics, both altruism and joy-of-giving depend on rational choice. See, eg  K 
Boulding, ‘Notes on a Theory of Philanthropy’, in Dickinson (ed), Philanthropy and Public Policy (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1962) 57, 60-63. 
25 K Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1996) 3. 
26 See, eg R Wuthnow, Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1991) 167-191. 
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we can assess the law’s basic assumptions. The economic framework is a methodological 
trowel for digging up and then critiquing the courts’ own concepts.  
II. THE LAW OF RETURN AND FRUSTRATED ALTRUISM 
It is argued that the rationale for return flows from a judicial view of donors as altruist 
consumers. First, it is seen that donors are treated in law as being motivated by the achievement 
of altruistic outcomes, or put another way, the delivery of charitable goods. Second, it is argued 
that judges divide between types of altruist. The law only returns to irredeemably frustrated 
altruists, termed as having a ‘particular charitable intention’27 at law. 
A. Donors are Assumed to be Economic Altruists 
Roberts defines altruism in charity as, ‘the case where the level of consumption of one 
individual enters the utility function of the other.28 And so economic altruism is the motivation 
to expend on the consumption of other people. This is a commonplace in our lives. We 
routinely give towards the material advantage of others. Crucially, such altruistic material 
impulse is outcome-orientated; we want to see something consumed by another person when 
we give. Culyer states in the context of health-care provision: 
It is possible to model altruism in utilitarian terms… in a health context, one is, perhaps, 
pleased to see another person healthier or with greater access to health care than would 
otherwise be the case.29 
An altruistic donor in a health context genuinely wants to see better health care delivered as a 
charitable good that others might consume.30 Rutherford describes the theory as, ‘charity as 
caring about the ends’.31 And indeed, the key point is the focus on outcomes. And so one way 
of understanding economic altruism is simply to say that the donor genuinely cares about her 
stated charitable objectives. For example, it is well known that Andrew Carnegie put much of 
his great industrial wealth towards the provision of public libraries.32 For him to be classifiable 
as an economic altruist, it is sufficient that he was genuinely concerned to provide that 
charitable good for the consumption of others, and equally, that his true motivation was not a 
purely egoistic legacy. In that case, he would have been motivated only by the joy-of-giving. 
Genuine concern with outcomes is the key to economic altruism. The mesh with legal charity 
is clear, as the law provides a catalogue of contexts in which expenditure on outcomes 
benefitting others is recognised. This is an ancient function of the law. The Preamble to the 
1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, from which the modern law developed,33 contains a brochure 
of broad material ends to which charitable funds might be validly applied. Of the lengthy list, 
                                                          
27 See, eg Woodhams (n4) 501; Lysaght (n5) 202; Re Ulverston and District New Hospital Building Trusts 
[1956] Ch 622 (CA), 640.  
28 Roberts, ‘A Positive Model of Private Charity’ (n12) 95. 
29 A Culyer, The Dictionary of Health Economics, 3rd edn (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2014) 637. 
30 If the donor wishes the consume the good herself, then she is at least partly egoistic according to the 
definition here, as she will give in an enjoyable anticipation of personal reward. For example, an individual 
might donate to public radio simply because she wants to wake up to it in the morning. Compare: H Hansmann, 
The Ownership of Enterprise (Harvard University Press, 1996) 230-231. 
31 Rutherford, ‘Get by with a Little Help’ (n2) 1038 
32 See, eg A Van Slyck, Free to all: Carnegie Libraries and American Culture 1890-1920 (Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1995) 8-19. 
33 See, eg Beveridge, Voluntary Action (n18) 193. 
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many remain familiar, such as the relief of aged, impotent and poor people, and the 
supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen. A more modern list is found in subsection 3(1) 
of the Charities Act 2011, encompassing in updated language, much of the historic law,34 and 
adding contemporary concerns such as the advancement of amateur sport35 and the welfare of 
animals.36  
The courts make the intuitive assumption that when donors give towards one of these charitable 
outcomes, they do so because they genuinely care about the consumption of others. The 
charitable pipeline is seen as altruistic plumbing to deliver an intended economic advantage to 
other people. The best evidence for this is the framework of frustrated outcomes and 
consequent return detailed in the next section. However, there is also another clue: common 
law judicial deference to the donor’s planned outcomes.   
At common law, judges have proclaimed themselves as bound to carry through the donor’s 
most precise schemes, and equally bound to refrain from subverting them. This is most 
apparent in circumstances where donors have made workable but low utility gifts and the courts 
have been called upon to reshape them into something more socially worthwhile. At common 
law,37 the courts have refused to do so. Or in the words of Sir John Romilly in Philpott v Saint 
George’s Hospital: 
[I]nstances of charities of the most useless description have come before the Court, 
but which it has considered itself bound to carry into effect. 38 
The judge does not pass comment; she simply effects the donor’s wishes. It is therefore a matter 
of logic that the donor is thought to care about outcomes. So in Philpott, Romilly MR continued 
to say that he would not speculate upon whether, ‘a different mode of application of the funds 
in charity should have occurred to the mind of the testator.39 And the same sentiment can be 
found in Re University of London Medical Sciences Fund, Williams LJ said, ‘the Courts [have 
never] thought it right to be benevolent with a testator’s money contrary to the plain intention 
of the will.40 Again, in Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Forde, Wilson J clearly 
articulated his respect for original donative intention, stating that he had, ‘always understood 
that the law was that a testator could leave his property by will to whomsoever he liked… the 
duty of the court was simply to read the will.’41 
Donors are assumed to be motivated by their stated plans. This expressed judicial deference to 
the donor’s chosen charitable goal, even where it is low utility. This flows as a matter of logic 
from an assumption that she is genuinely committed to its delivery. Courts envisage a limited 
role for themselves: they effect and protect the donor’s wishes, and they proclaim themselves 
resistant to any temptation to subvert her plans. An assumption of economic altruism is central 
to this judicial attitude; there would be no need to show such deference to a charitable end-goal 
if it was thought that the donor did not truly care about its effectuation.  
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Charities Act 2011, ss 3(1)(g). 
36 Charities Act 2011, ss 3(1)(k). 
37 This is no longer true in statute. See, eg Charities Act 2011, ss 67(3)(c). 
38 Philpott v Saint George’s Hospital (1859) 27 Beav 107, 112; 54 ER. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Re University of London Medical Sciences Fund [1909] 2 Ch 1 (Ch), 8 
41 Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Forde [1932] NI 1, 12. 
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B. Return is for Irredeemably Frustrated Altruists 
The clearest evidence of a judicial assumption of economic altruism is found in the relationship 
between frustration and return. Donors are thought genuinely motivated by the provision of 
charitable goods - material outcomes - for others. This leads to a micro-level economic 
understanding of the judicial rationale for return: where a gift fails, a donor will get it back 
because her outcomes are found to be frustrated.  
The relationship between frustrated altruism and return is a complex one. Return is not 
automatic for every frustrated donor. The courts have attempted to classify their altruists into 
types: those that are irredeemably frustrated by failure, and those whose frustration can be 
relieved by a judicial tonic. Upon a failure, only the truly frustrated will get a return. This is 
because, over a long period,42 judges have taken the view that some donors who have made 
failed gifts would, in fact, prefer for them to be modified and kept in charity on new terms.43 
These donors, for whom frustration is thought redeemable, are described as having a general 
charitable intention.  
Re Royce, provides an example of the courts’ approach to redeemable frustration and general 
intention. In the case, a gift was left to the Vicar and Churchwardens of Oakham Church for 
the benefit of the choir. The amount left was far in excess of anything that the choir needed 
and so the surplus sum was held to have failed. In order to prevent a return, Simonds J found a 
very general intention for the advancement of religion behind the gift. He stated: 
The charitable intention (and I use the word "charitable" in its legal sense) in giving 
money for the purpose of musical services in a church is for the advancement of 
religion.44 
The donor was thought to have a type of intention which would license the courts to fix the 
failure, apply it to general religion, and so keep the gift in charity. This precedential creation 
is an economically altruistic state of mind. A generally minded donor, such as found in Royce, 
is thought to be flexible, but still genuinely committed to the delivery of charitable goods for 
the consumption of others. The logic of the courts is, in essence, that her altruistic intention 
was so broad - in Royce, as broad as general religious consumption by humankind - that 
modification to keep the gift in charity would not frustrate her wishes. 
A second class of donors, those with a so-called particular charitable intention,45 is comprised 
of donors thought so irredeemably frustrated by the failure that nothing can be done for them. 
They are deemed to have been motivated only by a more specialised and unfixable charitable 
goal, causing the gift to be returned. To this end, Buckley J stated in Re Lysaght: 
[A] particular charitable intention exists where the donor means his charitable 
disposition to take effect if, but only if, it can be carried into effect in a particular 
specified way.46 
                                                          
42See generally R Mulheron, ‘The Modern Cy-près Doctrine: Applications and Implications’ (London, 
Routledge, 2006) 106-120. 
43 The concept of modification is well explained in Woodhams (n4), 503. 
44 Re Royce [1940] Ch 514 (Ch), 521. 
45 Above (n27). 
46 Lysaght (n5) 202. 
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The best known example of this narrow and return-causing intention is Re Wilson,47 where 
restrictions and conditions attached to a gift were so detailed as to present a picture of a donor 
wedded to specifics and details. The testator, a vicar from Cumberland, had sought to establish 
a school. His will outlined a personal charitable vision; the school and a school master’s house 
were to be paid for by the voluntary subscription of landowners and proprietors in specified 
parishes. The schoolmaster was to teach Latin, Greek and the elementary parts of mathematics 
to a timetable; scholars were to go free, but the cost for other pupils was to be 2s 6d at 
Midsummer and quarter pence at Christmas. Faced with evidence of tightly particular 
outcomes, the court thought the failure irredeemable, and effected a return. 
Crucially, the particular charitable intention - as developed by judges - is altruistic in the 
economic sense. It is perhaps true that the milk of material human kindness runs a little less 
fully in a donor with only a narrow and inflexible goal in mind, but this conception of intention 
still marks a gift motivated by the economic benefit of other people, and so it is materially 
altruistic. The donor is thought to be driven by the delivery of charitable outcomes, albeit 
outcomes so inflexible and precise as to be irredeemable by the court through a process of 
judicial modification.  
And so in an intention case, the court merely selects between two types of economic altruism, 
effecting a return where irredeemable frustration is found. The claim that the rationale for 
return rests in frustrated economic altruism is a layered one. Return is not automatic. Only the 
irredeemably frustrated get their money back. However, there is a clear conceptual point in 
play. The linked ideas of irredeemable frustration and return depend upon an assumption of 
economic altruism. It is only possible for donors who genuinely care about the delivery of 
charitable goods to others to suffer frustration. An egoistic donor, who gives without thought 
or concern for the material benefit of others will not be frustrated if such others do not receive 
it. 
III. THE EGOISTIC MOTIVATION 
Of course English judges have not taken a course in economic altruism. However, an 
apparently intuitive understanding of economic altruism has been seen to underpin the law of 
return. The rationale for return is that where a donor’s assumedly altruistic charitable outcome 
is irredeemably frustrated, she should get her money back.  
An analysis in donative economics has led the argument to this point, and the methodological 
trowel can dig further still. Since the 1980s, donative economists have in egoistic consumption, 
developed a complementary model of motivation based in self-interest. It posits that some 
donors give out of a desire for a self-interested joy-of-giving. The altruistic rationale for return, 
uncovered in the preceding section, cannot apply to them. Such donors give without concern 
for charitable outcomes. They give in consumption of a joy-of-giving, not other-regarding 
charitable goods. In consequence, they are indifferent whether or not other people materially 
benefit from their gift, and so its failure does not frustrate them. First, the theoretical challenge 
posed by economic egoism to altruism will be analysed, and second, it will be argued that 
egoistic gifts are outside the legal rationale of return. 
                                                          
47 Wilson (n 4). 
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A. Economic Egoism and Charitable Gifts 
Economic egoism is the 1980s child of its altruistic parent.48 Within the literature,49 egoistic 
motivation has been developed to provide an alternate aspect to the donor drive. Importantly, 
a purely egoistic donor will not be frustrated if certain charitable ends are not delivered. Her 
motivation is not charitable. The charitable end is incidental to her intent. She gives only 
because it is enjoyable to do so and without concern that any charitable plan is realised. 
A theory of egoistic motivation developed from a testable empirical flaw in altruistic models, 
so causing the emergence of an alter-ego to altruism.50 It arose because goal-regarding 
motivation suffers from a free-rider problem. That is, if donors are modelled as deriving 
satisfaction from the delivery of charitable goods, then they will have no motivation to give in 
circumstances where other hearts are also willing to provide.51 All they care about is that the 
goals are met by someone, not necessarily themselves. 
That testable hypothesis has been found wanting.52 There is no large-scale free riding; 
individuals give to charity even in the presence of contributions from other donors. And so 
egoism emerged as a theoretical response to that donation behaviour. In place of caring 
altruistically about charitable outcomes, it theorises that some donors give because they enjoy 
it. A new consumable good - often termed ‘glow’53 - is brought into the donor’s thought 
processes. Kotzebue describes the donor’s motivation as, ‘driven by the (essentially egoistic) 
wish to consume a purely private good.’54 And so egoistic motivation adds a new element to 
donative theory, located in the familiar economic terrain of self-interest. Boulding graphically 
illustrates the point: 
If we drop a dime in the blind man’s cup, it is because the blind man gives us something. 
We feel a certain glow of emotional virtue, and it is this that we receive for our dime.55 
Those mechanisms inducing joy-of-giving may be less socially desirable than emotional virtue. 
A striving for social recognition is a key psychological key driver of public consumption,56 and 
research by Andreoni and Petri suggests that where donors are identifiable, the size of their in-
study donation will increase. They find that, ‘by unmasking subjects, we allow for various 
social effects, like pride, shame, social comparison and prestige, to work.’57 A second, and 
directly intuitive, mechanism to induce a joy-of-giving is found in circumstances where donors 
are enticed by the supply, or the chance of winning private material inducements. Landry et al 
show that lottery fund-raising increases the sum of voluntary contributions.58 Similarly, in an 
                                                          
48 For the chronological development of economic donative theory see J Andreoni, The Economics of 
Philanthropy and Fundraising (Volume 1): Theory and Policy Toward Giving (Cheltenham, Edgar Elgar, 2015). 
49 Andreoni (n2); Harbaugh (n2). 
50 See generally Kotzebue (n1) 10-13; see especially Andreoni (n2). 
51 Warr, ‘The Private Provision of a Public Good’ (n12); Roberts (n12). 
52 See especially Andreoni (n2). 
53 Popularised by Andreoni Ibid. 
54 Kotzebue (n1) 1035. 
55 Boulding, ‘Notes on a Theory of Philanthropy’ (n24) 58. 
56 Harbaugh (n2); Dellavigna et al, ‘Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving’ (2012) 127 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1. 
57 J Andreoni and R Petrie, ‘Public Goods Experiments Without Confidentiality: A Glimpse into Fund-Raising’, 
(2004) 88 Journal of Public Economics 1605, 1620. 
58 Landry, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Economics of Charity’ (n17). 
 
10 
 
analysis of records at the English National Opera, Buraschi and Cornelli find a class of donors 
induced to give by special events and gala dinners.59 Where there is inducement through the 
supply of social benefit or material reward, the potential for egoistic joy-of-giving is clear.  
In economic donative theory, it is the joy-of-giving which provides the satisfaction, and not 
material inducements, or intangible social rewards per se.60 They operate only to make the gift 
more enjoyable. Such egoistic enjoyment is not kryptonite to altruism. There is nothing to 
prevent a donor from holding both egoistic and altruistic intentions at the same time.  In 
economic donative theory it is common to understand donors as existing on spectrum with 
‘pure altruism’ at one end, and ‘pure egoism’ at the other. And so it is possible, in between 
both ends of the spectrum, to both care about charitable ends and simultaneously derive an 
egoistic joy-of-giving.61 For example, a donor to a charitable lottery might both get a thrill 
from entry to the draw and genuinely hope her money will go to good causes. Or a relative 
disinheriting mainly from spite, might also care about the cats’ home. 
However, it is those economic models of donation where individuals are driven by nothing 
other than economic egoism - deriving no utility from charity itself - which challenge the law, 
and in turn, provide the focus of the following section.62 This is because, as will be seen, an 
entirely egoistic donor will sit outside of the law’s rationale for return. A donor motivated only 
by egoism will have no concern at all for the provision of charitable goods. In turn, her 
charitable intention cannot be frustrated on failure, and there is no need, at law to give the 
money back. 
B. Why Purely Egoistic Gifts should be kept in Charity 
 
It has been argued that the law of return is based in frustrated altruism, and so its rationale does 
not apply to an egoistic motivation that has not been at all frustrated. Later sections will search 
for instances of unacknowledged egoism in the precedents to pinpoint examples of return 
without any doctrinal basis. However, here, the appropriate legal response to egoistic gift-
making will be plotted. It is argued that purely egoistic transfers should continue to be treated 
as charitable gifts, but that they are outside the altruistic and end-driven rationale for return. 
They should be kept in charity. 
The law is only seriously challenged by purely egoistic donors. Where an individual 
simultaneously derives a joy-of-giving and also genuinely wishes to materially advance the 
lives of others, she can still be scooped up within the legal net of altruism. She can, without 
distorting the truth, be said to be at risk of frustration if the altruistic side of her motivational 
binary cannot be effected. In such circumstances, the judicial blind-spot to egoism is of 
conceptual interest, but of no legal consequence. It is only where the donor is a pure egoist,63 
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61 Andreoni, ‘Philanthropy’, in S Kolm and J Ythier (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and 
Reciprocity (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2006) 1126; P Glimcher et al, Neuroeconomics: Decision-Making and the 
Brain (Amsterdam, Academic Press, 2009) 317; B Kingma, ‘Public good theories of the non-profit sector: 
Weisbrod revisited’ (1997) 8 Voluntas 135, 139 
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that the doctrine of return is truly challenged. In that circumstance, where a donor is not 
motivated by altruistic outcomes at all, charitable failure cannot frustrate her self-interested 
intent. 
It is now possible to go where judges cannot, and map the purely egoistic motivation on to the 
law. Lost in a colder world of self-interest, it is initially tempting to leave behind charitable 
precedents and instead take recourse in the law of private express trusts. If egoistically 
motivated gifts were considered non-charitable, this would cause their return as a matter of 
precedent. As is well known, Megarry J suggested in Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2),64 that upon 
failure of a non-charitable gift, a resulting trust will occur automatically without any regard at 
all for intention. A later approach is more circumspect, but has similar effect. In Air Jamaica 
Ltd v Charlton, Lord Millett said of the resulting trust that it, ‘responds to the absence of any 
intention on his part to pass a beneficial interest to the recipient.’65 And so there is a strong, but 
not irrefutable,66 precedential presumption of return in most failed private express trust cases.67  
Yet taking cold comfort in the law of private trusts does not quite wash. Even though entirely 
ego-driven donations are non-altruistic, such gifts cannot without strain be classed as legally 
‘non-charitable’. Ego-motivated donors will be aware that their gifts were, before failure, 
destined for a legally recognised charitable end. They will expect their gift to go to charity, 
even if they are unmoved by the prospect. The distinction between an ego-driven and an 
altruistic outcome-driven donor goes to the nature of charitable motivation as it is understood 
at law, but it does not relate to any wider legal taxonomy. And so it is necessary to look for a 
way to fit egoistic donors within the law of charitable return. 
There is no doubt that the altruistic, outcome-driven logic of return does not apply in egoistic 
cases. The legal problem is that while an egoistic donor will be unconcerned with altruistic 
charitable ends, the law of return assumes their central importance. We have seen that courts 
treat donors as altruists, and that they return gifts in consequence of irredeemably frustrated 
altruistic goals. In consequence, the first reason not to return in cases of egoistic donation is 
straightforwardly that such donors are outside this rationale of the law. An egoistic donor has 
suffered no frustration of her altruistic plans. Despite the failure of her gift, she remains content 
because she derived egoistic satisfaction from the process of giving. For example, in New 
Forest Agricultural Show Society v The Commissioners of Customs and Excise, Nicol J 
described, in relation to fundraising, such a joy-driven enterprise as, ‘a function held in a 
vicarage or possibly manor garden (in the church hall if wet)’, including enjoyably social, yet 
profitable, competition such as, ‘guessing the length of a phenomenally large runner bean or 
the weight of a huge fruit cake, with a fee payable for each guess.’68 Donors sampling such 
bucolic and personally profitable pleasures will have been satisfied at the point of giving. It 
would be wrong to call them frustrated altruists in any sense. 
Alongside the negative reason not to return, there is also a positive legal reason to keep egoistic 
gifts in charity. While an egoistic donor is evidently not motivated the altruistic sense that she 
                                                          
64 Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) [1973] 3 WLR 744 (Ch), 764. 
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desires to see charitable outcomes, her gift is still a product of rational choice. She will expect 
it to go to charity, regardless of being unmoved by the prospect. She has therefore a type of 
legal expectation for the law to grasp a hold of. It must be conceded that the grip is weak. 
Merely effecting what the donor can be said to have expected, lacks the same legal normative 
force as carrying through what the donor positively wished, but in circumstances where there 
is no frustration at all, then keeping the gift in charity remains a legal effectuation of her 
decision to give. While a tombola player, motivated by the chance of winning a prize, will not 
in truth be concerned about the state of the church roof, she will in a weak sense expect the gift 
to be applied to legal charity. Although that is not the motivation, it is the incidental 
expectation. 
Such a legal outcome - keeping purely egoistic gifts in charity - is, at root, intuitive. The 
altruistic, donor’s gift, if she was concerned with charitable outcomes, has truly failed. Her 
altruism is frustrated, and she is a parallel position to a purchaser of unobtainable goods. By 
contrast, an egoistic donor will have been self-interestedly satisfied regardless of the failure. 
Following from her successful and contented consumption of joy-of-giving, she cannot also 
expect her money back. 
IV. RETURN WITHOUT A RATIONALE IN CONTEXTS OF PURE EGOISM 
It has been argued that the rationale for return rests on a legal understanding of donors as 
irredeemably frustrated economic altruists. It has also been argued, that where purely egoistic 
gifts might be found, the courts should not return them. It will now be argued that, in the context 
of failed both testamentary gifts and failed public appeals, the blind-spot to egoism causes 
fundamental doctrinal problems. 
A. Return without a Rationale: Purely Egoistic Motivation in the Testamentary 
Context 
Egoism is present but not prevalent in testamentary giving, and so while the existing framework 
of return falls into conceptual difficulty in egoistic cases, such instances of egoistic donation 
are infrequent enough to leave the system of testamentary construction as a whole unscathed.  
This section criticises the courts’ approach to egoistic motivation where it arises, but concludes 
with an acknowledgment of the broadly altruistic nature of testamentary charity. 
A first instance of purely egoistic donation in testamentary cases - gifts motivated by spite - 
graphically illustrates problems with existing rules which assume altruism. This is a most 
unfortunate joy-of-giving. Testamentary gifts to charity may disappoint survivors, and 
exclusion of hopeful recipients through a gift to charity, might induce a utilitarian joy akin to 
Bentham’s, ‘pleasures resulting from the view of any pain supposed to be suffered by the 
beings who may become the objects of malevolence.’69 Spiteful testamentary donors will give 
without concern for charitable ends, directing funds to charity in a far more malign frame of 
mind. The will in Mills v Farmer, shows a striking but rare example of open hostility. In the 
case, a testamentary donor partly disinherited his kin. He stated in his will that he would later 
name charitable objects, but he did not do so, leaving the court confronted with the vaguest of 
intentions. His testamentary papers included the telling direction: 
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It is needless to have any of my relations attend my funeral, as it is apt to breed ill will 
amongst them; and their grief on such occasions, is generally attended with hypocrisy.70 
In Mills v Farmer, the donor’s motivational enmity was presumably confined to his family. 
Yet in one remarkable instance, Re Satterthwaite’s Will Trusts,71 a donor was apparently 
motivated by her dislike of all humanity. Telling a bank official that she hated all human beings, 
the donor declared that she would leave everything to animals. She presented the bank official 
with a will written on brown paper, but after being advised to create a formal will, the donor 
then requested he compile a list of animal charities. With further insouciance to charitable 
outcomes, the gift was made by reference to the London classified telephone directory. 
The altruistic framework of return cannot be coherently applied in such cases. They are outside 
its rationale, and as it has been argued, such gifts are best kept in charity. A court of 
construction searching for irredeemably frustrated altruism, prepared to return the gift where it 
is found, misfires its precedents. Where donors are exclusively consuming joy-of-giving, 
charitable ends do not matter to them at all, and so the test for a general or a particular charitable 
intention has no traction. The law’s inability to recognise purely egoistic giving causes it a 
conceptual problem; it forces the courts to look for an altruistic motivation which might not be 
there, and possibly to effect return without any reason for doing so. There is no frustrated 
altruism in these cases. The donors - being dead at the point of failure – have already consumed 
an egoistic joy-of-giving in life. However, the law is unable to recognise that state of mind. 
Without a theory of egoistic donation in its tool-kit, it is not open for the courts to find that any 
altruistic charitable end was incidental to the gift. Instead, in each case, following the standard 
approach, the court looks incoherently for irredeemably frustrated altruism.  
A second instance of purely egoistic donation in testamentary cases - a desire to create a 
personal memorial72 - provides a direct example of return without a legal rationale. In the 
Victorian case, Re Gwilym, a donor hoped to open after death the ‘Gwilym Art Gallery and 
Museum’ in her own house. But she did not leave enough money for the plan, causing the gift 
to fail. Smith J noted her motivation directly, stating, ‘as appears from the direction that her 
name is to be attached to the museum and art gallery, she desired to establish a permanent 
memorial to herself.’ 73 On the application of ordinary principles, Smith J apparently found a 
particular charitable intention, returning the gift to her testamentary estate. Such an outcome is 
incoherent, but inevitable, in system of construction that does not recognise egoistic giving. 
Smith J was forced to discover, despite clear facts, an irredeemably frustrated concern for the 
benefit of others. This is a failure of the law, rather than a failure of the judge. It was 
straightforwardly not open, within the existing legal framework, to find that the donor had 
before death successfully consumed joy-of-giving in contemplation of her self-interested goals.  
This conceptual legal problem is a limited one because it impacts on only a relatively small 
number of cases. Although pure egoism in the form of spite and vanity can be inferred in the 
case reports, such instances are striking because they are unusual. While testamentary donors, 
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giving in contemplation of death,74 might be motivated by ‘legacy’, it is a generally an altruistic 
inheritance that they have in mind. In an interview-based investigation into the meaning of 
‘legacy’ in the context of aging, Hunter and Rowles identify a typology, ‘material’, ‘biological’ 
and ‘of values’.75 For those authors, the ends to which property is devoted appears important; 
participants in their study suggested that it is the third element - the transmission of values - 
which holds the most salience. They state in later work that, ‘a primary task in creating a legacy 
is determining the values we cherish most in life and conveying these values to our descendants 
and to our communities.76 In another parallel to our legal understanding of end-driven altruism, 
Wade-Benzoni et al suggest that legacies allow donors to, ‘form a psychological bond with 
others in the future, thereby symbolically extending themselves into the future and helping to 
fulfil their desires to establish a positive legacy.’77 While the personality of testamentary donors 
is undoubtedly wrapped up in their legacy, an end-driven and altruistic drive is likely to be 
present. 
Altruism can also be more commonly inferred in the case-reports than spite and vanity. For 
example, gifts are often directed at social change, and where this is the case, it must be likely 
that altruistic contemplation of the future will motivate the gift. For a very long period there 
have been gifts to reform prisons,78 or the abolition of slavery,79 and joining them in modern 
times, gifts for animal welfare have appeared in the reports,80 alongside gifts for the promotion 
of peace.81 Gifts are also often marked by a local flavour, suggesting a desire to confer genuine 
benefit upon a particular community. Gifts to local churches are relatively common,82 such as 
in Re Broadbent,83 where a bequest was left to a closed iron-framed mission church in 
Stalybridge. Community links can also be seen, such as in Re Sanders’ Will Trusts, where a 
gift was left to the working classes, preferably Dockers working in the Pembroke Docks.84 Also 
in Re Bagshaw,85 where a testamentary donor left a gift to the Bakewell and District War 
Memorial Cottage Hospital, which treated patients within a radius of five miles from the 
Bakewell Memorial Cross. Localised gifts suggest a genuine community end. 
In testamentary cases, the altruistic framework for return falters on occasion, but it is tested 
only rarely. It is true that where egoistic motivation is obviously present, such as in cases of 
spite or vanity, the law of return falls into a conceptual incoherence. There is no frustration of 
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altruistic intention, and it is argued that such gifts, being successful instances of egoistic 
consumption outside the rationale of return, should be kept in charity. Yet being beyond the 
paradigm case of testamentary altruism, they rarely trouble the courts. 
A. Return without a Rationale: Purely Egoistic Motivation in the Public Appeals 
Context 
Failed appeals are a relatively new legal problem in the precedents. The law of return developed 
over a long period of time in the context of wills,86 yet failed appeals emerged as a persistent 
legal issue only in the Twentieth Century.87 Their emergence followed both a wider diffusion 
of surplus wealth throughout society, and the establishment of professional fund-raising 
practices.88 A shift to the mass funding of charity was heralded by Lord Beveridge in Voluntary 
Action, by his optimistic statement that, ‘the democracy can and should learn to do what used 
to be done for the public good by the wealthy.’89 
Appeals often combine Beveridge’s democratic virtue with self-interest.90 Instances of purely 
egoistic donation will be identified from the case law. These are gifts made in return for a 
personal material reward, and gifts made in pursuit of a social benefit, such as public prestige. 
While the law has developed a coherent response to material benefit, it flounders with regard 
to gifts made in socially advantageous contexts. 
A first instance of public appeal donation - gifts motivated by a desire to receive a personal 
material benefit - is purely egoistic. Where donors are induced to pay into charity by the 
prospect of a personal reward, there is clear-cut joy-of-giving. There is also no incoherence to 
be found in the case law. There is no question of return. For example, if a contributor to a 
charitable campaign is motivated to receive concert tickets, publications, or the chance to enter 
for prizes, she will be treated as having parted entirely with her money and so denied a right to 
return. In Re West Sussex Constabulary’s Widows, Children and Benevolent Fund, a case 
concerning contributions to a non-charitable pension and dependent relative fund, Goff J stated, 
after detailed consideration of the charitable case law that the motivation was contractual:  
…The purchaser of a ticket may have the motive of aiding the cause or he may not; he 
may purchase a ticket merely because he wishes to attend the particular entertainment 
or to try for the prize…91 
Although the courts are not equipped with a theory of egoistic donation, Goff J’s statement 
comes startlingly close. It parallels the logic of economic analysis. The judge, who makes a 
distinction between outcome-driven gifts and those flowing from a joy-of-giving, shares its 
rationale. That is, if a donor is entirely motivated by such non-altruistic enjoyment as concert 
tickets, sweepstakes and lotteries, it is incoherent to look for irredeemable frustration of an 
intended altruistic outcome. In the case, Goff J directly found, ‘it appears to me to be impossible 
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to apply the doctrine of resulting trust.’92 Similarly, in Re British School of Egyptian 
Archaeology,93 subscribers to an educational archaeological society were held to be motivated 
by the receipt of handsomely produced academic research publications. Finding a contractual 
relationship with the charity, Harman J prevented a return. And so in this instance of pure 
egoism, the law is both settled and clear. Such gifts are kept in charity,  
By contrast, a second instance of purely egoistic donation - gifts prompted by a social reward 
– is met without such clarity. Where gifts are made out of a drive for social benefit or prestige, 
they are analogous to an egoistic exchange for material reward. Yet this is not recognised by 
the law. By way of example, a paradigm circumstance of gifts made for social benefit is found 
at charity auctions, where donors are prompted to bid excessively in order to gain social 
recognition.94 circumstances of social reward are not always so cut-throat or dramatic. A donor 
might derive a social benefit from smaller-scale social interactions,95 such as a collection 
amongst colleagues in a work place. Where the gift is motivated exclusively by a self-interested 
goal, the charitable end will be incidental to the decision to give. The motivation will be 
egoistic and not altruistic. 
The issue of egoistic social benefit has surfaced - albeit obliquely - in three cases involving 
community fund-raising for hospitals: Re Welsh Hospital (Netley) Fund,96 Re Hillier’s Trusts,97 
and Re Ulverston and District New Hospital Building Trusts.98 Unfortunately, no clear legal 
principle has emerged from repeated litigation. Taking the three cases together, it can be seen 
that certain judges have held that gifts made in contexts of social benefit should uniformly be 
kept in charity,99 but others have expressed a preference for return. So in Welsh Hospital, PO 
Lawrence J expressed, with reference to social fund-raising, a very strong view that return 
would be, ‘absurd on the face of it.’100 In that case, funds had been raised inter alia, ‘from 
collections in streets and at churches… in most of the towns and villages of Wales.’101 And in 
Hillier’s, Lord Denning picked up the mantle, stressing the loss of a right to return for appeals 
in social contexts. The judge held that gifts raised at a, ‘a church collection, a flag day, a whist 
drive, a dance, or some such activity,’ are given, ‘beyond recall.’102   
Yet at least two judges have countenanced the possibility of return in regard to funds raised in 
contexts of social benefit. So in Ulverston, Jenkins LJ stated obiter that if a person had, in the 
context of solicitation, put money into a collection box, and could satisfy the court that he had 
done so, then he, ‘should…be entitled to have his money back in the event of the failure.103 
And in Hillier’s, Romer J stated in a dissenting judgment, that any donor, ‘whether large or 
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small,’104 should be entitled to a return in principle. This approach leaves the door wide open 
for the return of egoistic gifts, but supplies no rationale for doing so. 
In contrast to testamentary donation, egoism is much closer to the paradigm in the context of 
appeals. In the context of gifts for material benefit (e.g. lotteries and prizes), the courts have 
come very close to recognising that fact.  However, where there is a purely egoistic social 
benefit derived from a public appeal, return is just as inappropriate. But the courts, without a 
fully articulated theory of egoistic motivation, have been unable to clearly express this view.  
V. A CONCEPTUAL STICKING-PLASTER: REFORM OF PUBLIC 
APPEALS 
In the preceding section it was argued that judges erroneously return purely egoistic gifts 
without a legal rationale for doing so in both testamentary and appeals contexts. In an ironic 
twist, targeted legislative reform prevents return, but without a satisfactory rationale for the 
change. Bereft of a theoretical underpinning, statute - directed at public appeals - turns the 
problem on its head. That is, return is prevented as a result of the statute, but the legal basis for 
doing so is theoretically flawed.  
The key reform concerns gifts made by unidentifiable105 and unknown106 donors. Under section 
64 of the Charities Act 2011, these donors are defined inter alia as those giving through a 
collection box, lottery, competition or sale.107 They are automatically and conclusively 
presumed have a general charitable intention,108 with the effect that return is precluded.109  
The micro-level economic perspective uncovers a conceptual problem; the statutory provisions 
sweep egoists under an altruistic carpet. It will be remembered that the general charitable 
intention is a form of broad and permissive altruism; it is the flexible and altruistic state of 
mind that permits judges to keep gifts in charity. And it is also clear that collection box, lottery, 
sale and competition donors are likely to be deriving either a social or material benefit from 
giving. They are most likely egoistic. While keeping their gifts in charity accords with the 
argument in this chapter - egoistic gifts should not be returned - fixing such egoistic donors 
with a statutorily presumed general altruism is conceptually flawed. 
The legislative reform to the law of public appeals was administratively, and not theoretically, 
driven. So at the House of Lords Committee Stage in relation to precursor legislation,110 Lord 
Silkin straightforwardly presented the view that the cases on appeals, in so far as they contradict 
or turn upon hair-splitting,111 should be rationalised. Only Lord Denning, sitting in a legislative 
capacity, hinted at deeper theoretical issues, stating that, ‘in a public appeal of this kind I would 
submit to your Lordships that a person gives his money and that that is the end of it, he does 
not expect to have it back.’112  
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The sensible administrative reform impulse behind the legislation can be forgiven. Return of 
gifts to unidentifiable donors is an impossibility, and so conclusively fixing them with a general 
charitable intention permits the courts to take the prudent step of definitively ruling out such 
implausible action. However, without a clear grasp of the relationship between donor 
motivation and the precedents, the law can be seen to have tied itself in a conceptual knot. It 
applies a model of outcome-driven altruistic intention - the general charitable intention - to a 
category of donors very likely to be egoistically consuming the joy-of-giving.  
The conceptual problem manifests itself in real-world legal artificiality. So on occasion, 
intuitively egoistic donors have been conclusively presumed to have an altruistic general 
charitable intention. For example, in South Scarborough Swimming Pool Association,113 the 
Charity Commission for England and Wales deployed the statutory power in relation to an 
underfunded swimming bath appeal,114 noting that part of the fund was raised by, ‘dances, 
social evenings, sponsored events115 Deploying the statute, a general charitable intention was 
found, permitting the gift to be used for the benefit of the local area. Yet in the context of 
dances and social evenings, it seems is far more likely that the donors were entirely motivated 
by joy-of-giving.116 The statute fixed the donors with a type of altruistic intention that they did 
not hold. 
The statute, as it relates to unidentifiable donors, is a sticking plaster over a theoretical sore. 
From the economic perspective worked through in this chapter, it can be seen that the reason 
that egoistic donors should receive no return is that they have suffered no frustration; they have 
contentedly and successfully consumed a joy-of-giving. Instead, the legislation treats them as 
general altruists. The statute pushes the court to the right conclusion - keeping the gifts in 
charity - but by the wrong route. Without recognition of egoistic donation, and 
acknowledgement that such intention is outside the rationale of return, the conceptual sore is 
left to fester. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Application of economic donative theory has uncovered the judicial rationale for return. The 
core point of the analysis is that the law treats donors as altruistic in the economic sense. Judges 
assume that donors care, and care deeply, about the delivery of material outcomes to others. In 
turn, this leads to the legal rationale for return. It is because the donor is thought to be giving 
in pursuit of genuinely desired charitable outcomes, that where those outcomes cannot be 
delivered, courts will return gifts with an apology note. Economic donative theory has shown 
that the rationale for return lies in an assumption of frustrated economic altruism. 
Economic donative theory is a critical as well as an explanatory tool. It shows, as a legal 
conceptual problem, that the courts have no understanding of egoism. Judges, at the level of 
principle, are only able to proceed on the basis that the gift before them has been made in the 
spirit of economic altruism. This leads to a fundamental strain. Where a donor is motivated by 
a purely egoistic joy-of-giving, it makes no sense to ask whether or not her goals have been 
frustrated. She is happy regardless. If her true motivation was spite to family, entry into a 
                                                          
113 Report of the Charity Commission for England and Wales (1980) 38. 
114 At that time: Charities Act 1993, s 14. 
115 Report of the Charity Commission (n 113) 38. 
116 See also Re Henry Wood National Memorial Trust v Moiseiwitsch [1966] 1 WLR 1601 (Ch). 
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lottery, or the accrual of social esteem, then she will not care what the judge does with her gift 
upon its incidental failure.  
These theoretical problems run deep, unsettling the doctrine once they are analysed. It is 
unsurprising that the sole attempt at legislative reform - in the context of public appeals – has 
been shown to founder. Without legal recognition of egoistic giving, both case-law and statute 
will inevitably tie themselves in knots. To iron them out, the courts should start by 
acknowledgement of the existence of egoistic gifts, and in consequence, keep those gifts in 
charity on the basis that such self-interested motivation is outside the legal rationale of the 
doctrine. 
